Implemented by
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=ftp
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=resource
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=jar
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=http
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=gopher
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=wyciwyg
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=moz-gnomevfs
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=about
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=moz-icon
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=data
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=moz-anno
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=view-source
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=file
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=https
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=javascript
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=chrome
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=feed
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=default
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=moz-safe-about
- @mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=pcast
nsIProtocolHandler @status FROZEN
[scriptable, uuid(15fd6940-8ea7-11d3-93ad-00104ba0fd40)]
interface nsIProtocolHandler : nsISupports
Constants
Constants for the protocol flags (the first is the default mask, the others are deviations): NOTE: Implementation must ignore any flags they do not understand. standard full URI with authority component and concept of relative URIs (http, ftp, ...)
const
unsigned long
URI_STD = 0
no concept of relative URIs (about, javascript, finger, ...)
const
unsigned long
URI_NORELATIVE = 1
no authority component (file, ...)
const
unsigned long
URI_NOAUTH = 2
The URIs for this protocol have no inherent security context, so documents loaded via this protocol should inherit the security context from the document that loads them.
const
unsigned long
URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT = 16
"Automatic" loads that would replace the document (e.g. <meta> refresh, certain types of XLinks, possibly other loads that the application decides are not user triggered) are not allowed if the originating (NOT the target) URI has this protocol flag. Note that the decision as to what constitutes an "automatic" load is made externally, by the caller of nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI. See documentation for that method for more information. A typical protocol that might want to set this flag is a protocol that shows highly untrusted content in a viewing area that the user expects to have a lot of control over, such as an e-mail reader.
const
unsigned long
URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT = 32
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | | ALL PROTOCOL HANDLERS MUST SET ONE OF THE FOLLOWING FOUR FLAGS. | | | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ These flags are used to determine who is allowed to load URIs for this protocol. Note that if a URI is nested, only the flags for the innermost URI matter. See nsINestedURI. If none of these four flags are set, the URI must be treated as if it had the URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE flag set, for compatibility with protocol handlers written against Gecko 1.8 or earlier. In this case, there may be run-time warning messages indicating that a "default insecure" assumption is being made. At some point in the futures (Mozilla 2.0, most likely), these warnings will become errors. The URIs for this protocol can be loaded by anyone. For example, any website should be allowed to trigger a load of a URI for this protocol. Web-safe protocols like "http" should set this flag.
const
unsigned long
URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE = 64
The URIs for this protocol are UNSAFE if loaded by untrusted (web) content and may only be loaded by privileged code (for example, code which has the system principal). Various internal protocols should set this flag.
const
unsigned long
URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD = 128
The URIs for this protocol point to resources that are part of the application's user interface. There are cases when such resources may be made accessible to untrusted content such as web pages, so this is less restrictive than URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD but more restrictive than URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE. See the documentation for nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI.
const
unsigned long
URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE = 256
Loading of URIs for this protocol from other origins should only be allowed if those origins should have access to the local filesystem. It's up to the application to decide what origins should have such access. Protocols like "file" that point to local data should set this flag.
const
unsigned long
URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE = 512
Loading channels from this protocol has side-effects that make it unsuitable for saving to a local file.
const
unsigned long
URI_NON_PERSISTABLE = 1024
Channels using this protocol never call OnDataAvailable on the listener passed to AsyncOpen and they therefore do not return any data that we can use.
const
unsigned long
URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA = 2048
This protocol handler can be proxied via a proxy (socks or http) (e.g., irc, smtp, http, etc.). If the protocol supports transparent proxying, the handler should implement nsIProxiedProtocolHandler. If it supports only HTTP proxying, then it need not support nsIProxiedProtocolHandler, but should instead set the ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP flag (see below). @see nsIProxiedProtocolHandler
const
unsigned long
ALLOWS_PROXY = 4
This protocol handler can be proxied using a http proxy (e.g., http, ftp, etc.). nsIIOService::newChannelFromURI will feed URIs from this protocol handler to the HTTP protocol handler instead. This flag is ignored if ALLOWS_PROXY is not set.
const
unsigned long
ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP = 8
Attributes
The default port is the port that this protocol normally uses. If a port does not make sense for the protocol (e.g., "about:") then -1 will be returned.
readonly attribute
long
defaultPort
Returns the protocol specific flags (see flag definitions below).
readonly attribute
unsigned long
protocolFlags
The scheme of this protocol (e.g., "file").
readonly attribute
ACString
scheme
Methods
Allows a protocol to override blacklisted ports. This method will be called when there is an attempt to connect to a port that is blacklisted. For example, for most protocols, port 25 (Simple Mail Transfer) is banned. When a URI containing this "known-to-do-bad-things" port number is encountered, this function will be called to ask if the protocol handler wants to override the ban.
boolean
allowPort(in long port, in string scheme)
Constructs a new channel from the given URI for this protocol handler.
nsIChannel
newChannel(in nsIURI aURI)
Makes a URI object that is suitable for loading by this protocol,
where the URI string is given as an UTF-8 string. The caller may
provide the charset from which the URI string originated, so that
the URI string can be translated back to that charset (if necessary)
before communicating with, for example, the origin server of the URI
string. (Many servers do not support UTF-8 IRIs at the present time,
so we must be careful about tracking the native charset of the origin
server.)
@param aSpec - the URI string in UTF-8 encoding. depending
on the protocol implementation, unicode character
sequences may or may not be %xx escaped.
@param aOriginCharset - the charset of the document from which this URI
string originated. this corresponds to the
charset that should be used when communicating
this URI to an origin server, for example. if
null, then UTF-8 encoding is assumed (i.e.,
no charset transformation from aSpec).
@param aBaseURI - if null, aSpec must specify an absolute URI.
otherwise, aSpec may be resolved relative
to aBaseURI, depending on the protocol.
If the protocol has no concept of relative
URI aBaseURI will simply be ignored.
nsIURI
newURI(in AUTF8String aSpec, in string aOriginCharset, in nsIURI aBaseURI)
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